Georgetown University Law Center
6–7 March 2015
The Human Right to Die
From Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp to Pelican Bay State Prison, in recent years a discourse of human rights has been mobilized to justify the forced feeding of hunger striking prisoners. Keeping alive at all costs, the biopolitical logics of forced feeding are counterposed to suicide, which is presented as an aberration of human life, a temporary deviance in need of correction. Taking solitary confinement as its scene of study, this paper considers suicide as thanatopolitical—that is, as a threat to, interruption of, and corporeal critique of neoliberal biopolitics. But it is not simply death, in opposition to bare life, that is at stake for the suicide: it is what Blanchot theorizes as “the Openness of a community.” This Openness is a condition for human rights, which must be founded in community, and not upon bare biological life. In other words, “the right to have rights,” to use Arendt’s phrase, depends upon the relevance of speech, which is radically undermined by solitary confinement, but which nevertheless emerges in flickering moments of solidarity across the solitary archipelago. Conceived in this manner, the Openness of community must be underwritten by suicide—the only death that actively contests the biopolitical state power “to make live and let die.”
Critical Legal Conference
Biopolitical Mor(t)alities: Canadian Law, Biomedicine, and Neocolonial Imaginaries in the Case of a Young First Nations Girl
Stuart J. Murray and Tad Lemieux
Suffering with acute lymphoblastic leukaemia, eleven-year-old Makayla Sault, a First Nations girl, refused continued chemotherapy treatments after reporting that Jesus had visited her in a vision. Her doctors reported her to the relevant Children’s Aid Society in order to determine, according to Canada’s Health Care Consent Act, whether she was “capable” of refusing treatment. This paper analyses the widespread media response to the ruling that deemed Makayla “capable,” and problematises law’s silence on the question of her religious fundamentalism and her Indigeneity. Indeed, there is legal precedence from the Supreme Court of Canada to remove a minor, and to force biomedical treatment, on the basis of religious belief rendering a minor “incapable.” In this case, however, although Makayla’s Indigeneity seems to have been a deciding factor in the case, (neo)liberal state institutions would undermine their own authority, and the mechanisms of that authority, if they were to admit that “capacity” belongs also—or perhaps even primordially—to a people on the basis of shared tradition, culture, or even ancestral heritage. If the state embarked on such a debate, it would expose the fictional nature of individual “capacity,” along with the fragile authority—and arbitrary violence—by which the state itself produces and polices individuality as an instrument of biopolitical governance, if not subjugation. This paper uses the case of Makayla Sault to critically trace the medico-legal imaginaries that were mobilized to produce, bestow, and to reify the moral fiction of a “capable” individual, rather than engage a discourse on decolonisation.
Life, in Theory
European Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts
3–6 June 2014
Towards an Etho-Rhetorical Critique of “Affirmative” Biopolitics
This paper stages an encounter between Heidegger and Foucault, offering an ontology of care as a critical response to recent scholars who propose an “affirmative” biopolitics (Campbell, Esposito, Hardt & Negri, Rose, Santner). Heidegger’s Being and Time characterizes human being as “distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.” This self-reflexivity revolves around the ontological structure of care. In his late work, Foucault turns to the Hellenistic “care of the self” (epimeleia heautou) and argues that the self’s relation to itself represents an ethic of care. For both thinkers the tropological constitution of the human subject is paramount. My contention is that “affirmative” biopoliticians have not understood the rhetoricity of narrative and are caught within a utilitarian, neoliberal ethic. I offer a reading of the crucial midway point of Being and Time (§42), where Heidegger cites Hyginus’ first-century CE fable, “Care [Cura].” Significantly, this is the only moment in which his text deploys narrative, mythological or otherwise. I examine this radical shift in rhetorical registers and argue that the fable, which narrates the creation of the human, also functions performatively by prompting a meditation on language and death.Foucault’s “care of the self” is relevant here because the self-relation is rhetorical, based on the non-instrumental understanding of “use” (chresis). Care, then, is the “use” the self makes of itself, mediated through an aesthetics of existence—a rhetorical conception of life (bios), evidenced through Foucault’s final lectures on the fabled death of Socrates.
Rhetoric Society of America Conference
San Antonio, TX
22–26 May 2014
Pronouncing Death: Biopolitical Affirmations
What, then, calls me into question most radically? Not my relation to myself as finite or as the consciousness of being before death or for death, but my presence for another who absents himself by dying. —Blanchot, The Unavowable Community
The suicide bomber is unimaginable: irreparably irrational, radicalized, Islamicized. However, few figures circulate more widely in the War on Terror, operating as its ultimate raison d’être. This paper argues that the suicide bomber is the “unimaginable” and generalized face of “the terrorist”—enemies of the state who will their own deaths, revoking their lives, such that killing is little more than passively “letting die” those who are figured as “already dead,” unsurvivable. To kill is little more than pronouncing death, a biopolitical pronouncement spoken anonymously in the name of life itself. The sovereign spectacle of the scaffold is displaced by a disappearing public sphere: “black sites” like Guantanamo, the vaporized victims of drone strikes, clandestine burial at sea. Producing the death it disavows, foreclosing on compassion and identification with the dead, what hope is left for an ethical intervention in the War on Terror? In whose voice would it speak?
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
23 – 25 May 2011
“Making Live and Letting Die”: Media, Technoculture, and the Global Biopolitics of Death
I draw my title from Foucault’s (2008) characterisation of biopolitics, where the ‘life’ of the population is the means by which individuals are governed–as collectivities whose very lives and vital wellbeing are increasingly subject to governmental control, surveillance, regulation, and segregation, through forecasts, risk-management, statistical measures, and other mediatised forms of bio-moral orthopaedics. The biopolitical power to ‘make live and let die’ has gradually displaced classical sovereign power to ‘take life or let live’. Modern politics has seized the power to bestow ‘life’; and consequently, others must be ‘allowed to die’–a whole class of people whose lives do not count as life, including prisoners, refugees, those lost as ‘collateral damage’ in modern warfare, victims of biopharmaceutical testing and profits, ‘negative externalities’ in the global march of neoliberalism, and so on. Death, Foucault writes, has replaced sex as the great taboo. Death has been ‘outsourced’, and those of us who are ‘made to live’ better and longer lives frequently do so at the cost of those others who are ‘allowed to die’.